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1. Whether a nursing home’s proprietary electronic admissions platform successfully attributed a personal guarantee clause to a resident’s daughter under the Pelican Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, Pel. Stat. § 670.001 et seq. (“PUETA”), where the facility created and controlled the account used for signing, and where the signature on the challenged clause was recorded three seconds after the prior page.

2. Whether a conditional personal-liability clause in a nursing home admissions agreement constitutes a prohibited third-party guarantee under the federal Nursing Home Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(c)(5)(A)(ii), and its implementing regulation, 42 C.F.R. § 483.15(a)(3), or whether it is a permissible contract for a representative’s independent obligations.

1. Whether defendants are precluded from asserting as-applied challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) under the Second Amendment, as the Eighth Circuit and its progeny hold, or whether as-applied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) remain available to defendants, as the Third Circuit and its progeny hold?

2. Assuming an as-applied challenge exists, whether application of 18 U.S.C.§ 922(g)(1) to a single twenty-year-old conviction for felony child neglect violates the Second Amendment?

1. Whether defendants are precluded from asserting as-applied challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) under the Second Amendment, as the Eighth Circuit and its progeny hold, or whether as-applied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) remain available to defendants, as the Third Circuit and its progeny hold?

2. Assuming an as-applied challenge exists, whether application of 18 U.S.C.§ 922(g)(1) to a single twenty-year-old conviction for felony child neglect violates the Second Amendment?

Riverside Pharmacy (recreational cannabis business) challenges Hesperian's cannabis regulatory scheme.

I. Does a state law that requires all members, governors, or agents of business entities seeking a license to sell recreational cannabis within Hesperian to have lived within Hesperian for the six months prior to application violate the United States Constitution, specifically the dormant Commerce Clause?

II. If such a state law does violate the dormant Commerce Clause, is a preliminary injunction appropriate, particularly in light of the fact that the plaintiffs have “unclean hands” by violating federal cannabis law1?

III. Does the National Labor Relations Act preempt state laws that require cannabis businesses to enter into Labor Peace Agreements with workers, particularly under the basis of Garmon preemption?

IV. Does a law that requires employers to remain neutral with respect to a bona fide labor organization’s representatives communicating with the employees of the applicant or the license about the rights afforded to such employees violate an employer’s First Amendment rights?

Riverside Farmacy (recreational cannabis business) challenges Hesperian's cannabis regulatory scheme. 

I. Does a state law that requires all members, governors, or agents of business entities seeking a license to sell recreational cannabis within Hesperian to have lived within Hesperian for the 6 months prior to application violate the United States Constitution, specifically the dormant commerce clause?

II. If such a state law does violate the dormant commerce clause, is a preliminary injunction appropriate, particularly in light of the fact that the plaintiffs have “unclean hands” by violating federal cannabis law1?

III. Does the National Labor Relations Act preempt state laws that require cannabis businesses to enter into Labor Peace Agreements with workers, particularly under the basis of Garmon preemption2?

IV. Does a law that requires employers to remain neutral with respect to a bona fide labor organization's representatives communicating with the employees of the applicant or the license about the rights afforded to such employees violate an employer’s First Amendment rights?

Questions Presented:

1. Whether the government may remove books from public high school libraries on topics with which it disagrees without offending the First Amendment?

2. Whether plaintiff or defendant bears the burden of proof to demonstrate that the venue is proper or improper when moving to dismiss a case for improper venue and whether venue was proper in District of Illiana?

Zoom link (ONLY FOR PRACTICES LABELED ZOOM): https://uclawsf.zoom.us/j/8281693464?omn=97636965468

I. Whether there should be an exception to Garcetti for the scholarly

activities of professors at institutions of higher learning and, if so,

whether the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the

Environmental Objectivity Act violates the First Amendment;

II. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the

Environmental Objectivity Act unconstitutionally vague.

I. WHETHER LAW ENFORCEMENT’S USE OF POLE CAMERAS VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.

a. Whether Mr. Miller demonstrated a subjective expectation of privacy in his backyard.

b. Whether Mr. Miller’s expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable in light of

the artificial intelligence capabilities in the pole camera and the long-term and

continuous nature of the surveillance.

II. WHETHER THE SEARCH OF MR. MILLER’S BATHROOM AND PHONE VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.

a. Whether Mr. Schultz had apparent authority to consent to law enforcement’s

search of Mr. Miller’s bathroom under the Third-Party Doctrine.

b. Whether Mr. Schultz had apparent authority to consent to law enforcement’s

search of Mr. Miller’s phone under the Third-Party Doctrine.

Questions Presented:

1. Whether a healthcare system can be held vicariously liable under the doctrine of apparent agency for the diagnostic errors of an autonomous AI software tool integrated into its branded telehealth platform.

2. Whether Respondent’s claims are barred by Shawnee’s four-year statutes of repose or whether the repose periods were tolled/extended by:

(a) Cyber MD’s annual diagnostic evaluations constituting a “continuous course of treatment” under Shawnee Revised Statute § 12-404; or

(b) The latent, un-discoverable nature of the algorithmic flaw and subsequent retraining under the exceptions in Shawnee Revised Statute § 12-410.

Questions Presented:

1. Whether a healthcare system can be held vicariously liable under the doctrine of apparent agency for the diagnostic errors of an autonomous AI software tool integrated into its branded telehealth platform.

2. Whether Respondent’s claims are barred by Shawnee’s four-year statutes of repose or whether the repose periods were tolled/extended by:

(a) Cyber MD's annual diagnostic evaluations constituting a "continuous course of treatment" under Shawnee Revised Statute § 12-404; or 

(b) The latent, un-discoverable nature of the algorithmic flaw and subsequent restraining under the exceptions in Shawnee Revised Statute § 12-410.

1. Whether, when a servicemember's DD-214 reflects a general (under honorable conditions) discharge, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) must look beyond the character of the discharge to evaluate a claimant's eligibility for VA disability benefits under section 5303(a), notwithstanding § 3.12(a)?

2. Whether, assuming the VA must independently determine if section 5303(a) applies, the statutory bar applies when a veteran is discharged "by reason of the sentence of a general court-martial" when a clemency board remits the former servicemember's sentence before separation?

(1) Whether a sniff by a drug-detecting dog of an individual crossing the United States border constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.

(2) If a dog sniff is a search, whether that search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when conducted without obtaining a warrant.

Four former employees of a telecommunications company attempted to sell proprietary software to an overseas buyer, believing the software was confidential and protected. Unbeknownst to them, the company had already publicly released the software under an open-source license. The employees transmitted the software through an internet-based file-sharing platform and were later charged with attempt and conspiracy under federal law.

Issues addressed:

1. Legal-impossibility issue: Is legal impossibility a defense to attempt and conspiracy when defendants intended to steal and sell proprietary software, but the software had actually been publicly released as open-source before they acted?
2. Interstate-commerce issue: When a federal statute requires conduct to occur “in interstate or foreign commerce,” must the government prove that the actual file/message crossed a state or national border, or is using an internet-based messaging/file-sharing platform enough?

Four former employees of a telecommunications company attempted to sell proprietary software to an overseas buyer, believing the software was confidential and protected. Unbeknownst to them, the company had already publicly released the software under an open-source license. The employees transmitted the software through an internet-based file-sharing platform and were later charged with attempt and conspiracy under federal law.

Issues addressed:

1. Legal-impossibility issue: Is legal impossibility a defense to attempt and conspiracy when defendants intended to steal and sell proprietary software, but the software had actually been publicly released as open-source before they acted?
2. Interstate-commerce issue: When a federal statute requires conduct to occur “in interstate or foreign commerce,” must the government prove that the actual file/message crossed a state or national border, or is using an internet-based messaging/file-sharing platform enough?